Racialized arguments that are almost racist: my letter to The Conversation

No Conversation in The Conversation Canada

Scott White, Editor -in-Chief of The Conversation Canada, ignored this letter regarding a mischaracterization that one of his editors made of a public letter that I co-signed with other colleagues defending academic freedom. His behaviour is not an example of being “open, transparent and accountable,” and certainly not a good journalistic practice. Here is my letter:

February 9, 2021

Scott White

CEO | Editor-in-Chief

The Conversation (Canada)

Dear Scott,

Judging people’s opinions based on their race should be considered racist. No? Well, it depends who you ask. If you think you have the “right” opinion or the “right” theory, then your judgment won’t be considered racist, even if it looks very much like that. 

Let’s take the following statement: “Last fall, a group of 34 university professors wrote a letter in support of the use of the n-word in classrooms. Every single one of the letter writers was white. Why is this conversation still happening? Why do white and non-Black people insist on uttering that word, the n-word? And when asked not to use it, why are they fighting for control of it? (published in The Conversation as a teaser for the podcast Don’t call me resilient by Senior Editor and Producer, Vinita Srivastava) (see screenshot of a similar teaser that was emailed to the portal’s readers).

Or read this one (originally in French commenting a public letter signed by 579 professors and lectures from Québec): “I told myself that I had to look at the evidence, and it took me hours to find the photos of the 579 professors and lectures to know how many whites and non-whites signed this letter. The result is terrifying, but not surprising. From those 579 signatories, 97.2% are white persons. That means that only 2.8% are racialized people. From that small number only 0.5% are black.” (published on the website Ricochet by Will Prosper) 

In both cases, the authors of these statements pretend to judge or disqualify the opinions of those who wrote the respective texts because they were “white.” We can call these “arguments” ad ethnicity (the equivalent of ad hominem but racialized). They are very weak but also very dangerous. They are based on impressions and prejudices, since the persons who wrote those statements don’t know the people who signed the op-eds. And what being “white” means according to them? For example, I am one of the 34 professors from the University of Ottawa who signed last fall an op-ed (in French) supporting part-time professor Lieutenant-Duval and defending academic freedom. Am I “white?” It depends, again, who you ask. I am a Venezuelan Sephardic Jew who was born in Tangier, Morocco. Should I consider myself a Latino? My mother tongue is Spanish. I grew up in a Latin American country. Am I the typical “white” (whatever that means) who migrated to Canada? The other 33 colleagues who signed the public letter have different origins and backgrounds, and the languages they speak, their religions (or lack of), their skin colour should not be used to invalidate their views on the issue of academic freedom.

But there is even a more troubling issue in these statements. They represent an inquisitorial mindset looking for the “pure” and the “tainted,” as the Spanish Inquisition used to do when persecuting the heretics and the crypto-Jews. They also convey a new rhetoric of stigmatization under the disguise of “social justice” and egalitarian aim. Historically, the “good causes” (i.e. the salvation of the souls) have ended in terrible tragedies and crimes.

As you can see in these statements, there is a very thin line dividing the “racialized” and “racist” discourses. Those using the racialized rationale to disqualify the opinions of other people should remember the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream today.” Amen.   

I hope you will publish the entire content of this letter in The Conversation. I consider this a matter of editorial fairness and good journalistic practice. 

Cordially, 

Isaac Nahón-Serfaty

Associate Professor

University of Ottawa

Notes about the grotesque and the kitsch (1)

Cute goats in a campaign about diabetes.

The approach we propose to study the images and emotions in different communication strategies takes into account two extremes: the grotesque and the kitsch. We believe that by studying these two polarities of the visual and the passions associated with them, we can analyze the configuration of an economy of emotions and the sensible in the ecosystem of digital media.

We understand by visually grotesque everything that refers to a degraded materiality (deformed, diseased, decadent, dead), especially in relation to the human body or the body of other animal species.

By visually kitsch, we understand everything that appeals the audience from the codes of sentimentality and the oversaturation of the sensible (hence, its association with the cloying).

The grotesque and the kitsch share characteristics. They are based on material and symbolic exuberance or abundance (their iconic features are overloaded or exaggerated), they are "abnormal" (that is, they contradict the norm according to certain criteria of the beautiful or the good), and they can be attractive for a large number of people (precisely because of the repulsion or sentimentality they arouse in the public).

Being extraordinary (in the sense of "out of order"), the grotesque and the kitsch disrupt a certain monotony of the media landscape, and appear as "emerging data", event for a short period of time, managing to stand out in the crowded flow of images, texts, sounds and impressions circulating in the digital ecosystem.

The grotesque and the kitsch contribute to strengthening the strategic features of public communication, either in marketing, propaganda or public relations, because thanks to their affective tones they are able to attract attention, elicit a feeling, provoke reproduction (i.e. " viral effect"), trigger a conversation, and generate a moral assessment.

Both aesthetic expressions mobilize passions (sometimes in a pathetic way) that can lead to cognitive elaboration about the object, situation, person or issue associated with the grotesque or kitschy image. It is because of their shocking or sentimental nature (i.e. corny) that both aesthetic categories break with the distinction between emotion and reason, or body and mind, showing that the sensible and the cognitive form a unity.

The grotesque and the kitsch lead from the aesthetic to the ethical, superimposing the problem of taste (in the sense of sensible appreciation) with that of moral evaluation (in the normative and values spheres).

Because of its "scandalous" or excessive tones, the grotesque and the kitsch can promote extreme moral reactions (impassioned adhesions or rejections). Precisely, the disproportion of both aesthetic forms appears in contrast with the sublime or other representations which produces awe or reverential admiration before a certain measured or balanced order.